

The background of the slide is a dark, abstract digital landscape. It features a network of white lines connecting various nodes, some of which are highlighted with glowing blue circles. In the upper left, there are several glowing white padlocks of varying sizes, some appearing to be part of a larger, faintly visible padlock structure. The overall aesthetic is futuristic and tech-oriented, with a color palette dominated by dark blues, greys, and bright whites and oranges.

# SECURE-BY-DESIGN IOT OPERATION WITH SUPPLY CHAIN CONTROL

## DOSS Project Overview



## 1. Project introduction and goals

- a. The consortium
- b. Supply Chain Protection
- c. Software security and identification information

## 2. Project details

- a. Artefacts under tests
- b. Security assurance modules and its workflow
- c. Product and operation security assurance

## 3. Standardization activities

- a. Potential SDOs
- b. ETSI MTS TST NWIs



# General

**Goals, architecture and methodology of the DOSS project**



**Funded by  
the European Union**

This project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon Europe research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 101120270

DOSS - Secure-by-Design IoT Operation with Supply Chain Control  
<https://dossproject.eu>

# The DOSS project consortium



**Atos**



**CERTH**  
CENTRE FOR RESEARCH & TECHNOLOGY HELLAS

**Fraunhofer**  
FOKUS



**UNIVERSIDAD  
DE MURCIA**



**RED ALERT LABS**  
IoT Security

**SAFEPAY**

**IITIS**

**ásvin**

**tecnal:a**

MEMBER OF BASQUE RESEARCH  
& TECHNOLOGY ALLIANCE

**THALES**

**EVIDEN**



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- **Poor communication within supply chain; no feedback loop**
  - Supply Trust Chain
  - Device Security Passport (DSP) incl. SBOM, HBOM, MUD
- **Large scale attacks**
  - December 2020 SolarWind, January 2021 MIMECAS, May 2021 Colonial Pipeline
- **Cascading effects**
  - e.g. CVE-2021-44228 (log4j)
- **Huge economic impact**
  - In 2021 the number of supply chain attacks tripled compared to the previous year .
    - Argon, 2021 Software Supply Chain Security Report



# DOSS elaborates a secure-by-design methodology

implements related technology for complex IoT architectures based on

- SUPPLY CHAIN MONITORING
- COMPONENT TESTING
- ARCHITECTURE MODELLING



# Project details

**Security assurance modules and its workflow**




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## Define the “Supply Trust Chain”



**Collect and store reliable/verified data** (e.g. DSP) from software & hardware suppliers including security characteristics.

**Update lifecycle status** by all authorized actors along the product/software/component supply chain.

All actors of the supply chain will **have real-time, online, actionable access to cybersecurity related information** which may be relevant for their IoT services and architectures.

- Formalize information sharing, data exchange between links of the supply chain – content, format and protocols
- Specify workflows
- Build proof of concept
- Standard recommendation



## A **machine-readable** document containing diverse **security related product information**

- From existing quasi or de facto standards to be included
  - Certificates (if any), Software Bill of Material, Hardware Bill of Material, Manufacturer Usage Description file, VEX, intended security level of usage scenario (EU CSA type labelling) and potentially other relevant information.
- Extension of the content of MUD files, VEX, SBOM and HBOM with **additional security related information**



A **multi-function module for the security testing** of all components of a service architecture

Devices will be screened **based on their DSPs**

Implementing **SAST, DAST and IAST** approach for

- Especially for OSS and self-developed SW
- Establish a DevSecOps Pipeline

3rd party software will be assessed using **binary code-validation techniques**



Technology for the **automated onboarding and update** of even large number of devices

- Definition of the **necessary information** for the DSP (model ID, certificate, MUD file, etc.)
  - required to **identify and configure devices before** providing access to the designated network of the architecture
- Automated processing of DSP
- Use of attestation tokens
- Implementation of a reference architecture for the secure onboarding mechanism





The system will be able to **simulate the security context of diverse IoT system architectures** on the same hardware infrastructure to identify potential threats and security weaknesses already in their **design phase and prior to any configuration changes**.

- Implementation of a **configurable architecture using infrastructure automation technologies** that enable flexible creation of virtualized environments
- Automated generation of attack scenarios and their **transformation into executable security test cases**
- Use of **ML and AI for generating attack scenarios** and recommending counter measures against such attacks



**Verification of the design concept of IoT architectures** prepared by the DCT against selected security standards and/or compliance requirements.

- **(Semi)automated transformation of standards** into formal and uniform representation of the requirements that an IoT system should comply with
- **Automated compliance checking of IoT architectures** against the selected, transformed standards
- Generation of **composite indicators measuring the compliance level** of IoT architectures – pre-certification



Three pilot cases will be introduced based on existing IoT platforms representing diverse domains: **Automotive, Energy and Smart Home**

- Secure operating architectures will be **established with multiple security tools** and system
- **Service architectures will be connected to the Supply Trust Chain**
- Performance of new modules will be validated, security of the **end-to-end supply chain will be assessed**

# Standardization activities

Potential SDOs and contribution to MTS WG TST



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- **Working closely with the relevant Standard Developing Organisations**

- National
  - DIN (German Institute for Standardisation)
- European
  - ETSI
  - ENISA
- International
  - ISO/IEC
  - IETF
  - Global Platform

- **Making context-relevant recommendations in respect of future standards**

- **Submission of the DOSS results for consideration**
  - Technical Specification (TS)
    - Security validation methodology for supply trust chains (Component Tester)
  - Technical Specification (TS)
    - Specification of a Device Security Passport
  - Technical Specification (TS)
    - Integrated IoT supply trust chain concept
  - Technical Report (TR)
    - Supply Trust Chain Applications and Assurance



# THANK YOU!



## INFORMATION

<https://dossproject.eu/>

## CONTACT US

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