ESS Update: Adding CertID Algorithm Agility
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Abstract

In the original Enhanced Security Services for S/MIME draft, a structure for cryptographically linking the certificate to be used in validation with the signature was introduced, this structure was hardwired to use SHA-1. This document allows for the structure to have algorithm agility and defines new attributes to deal with the updating.

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1. Introduction

In the original Enhanced Security Services (ESS) for S/MIME draft [ESS], a structure for cryptographically linking the certificate to be used in validation with the signature was defined. This structure, called ESSCertID was hardwired to use a SHA-1 hash value. The recent attacks on SHA-1 require that we change define a new attribute which allows for the use of a different algorithm. This document performs that task.

This document defines the structure ESSCertIDv2 along with a new attribute SigningCertificateV2 which uses the updated structure. This document allows for the structure to have algorithm agility and defines new attributes to deal with the updating.

1.1. Notation

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
2. Replace Section 5.4 'Signing Certificate Attribute Definitions'

The signing certificate attribute is designed to prevent simple substitution and re-issue attacks, and to allow for a restricted set of authorization certificates to be used in verifying a signature.

Two different attributes exist for this due to a flaw in the original design. The only substantial difference between the two attributes is that SigningCertificateV2 allows for hash algorithm agility, while SigningCertificate forces the use of the SHA-1 hash algorithm. With the recent advances in the ability to create hash collisions for SHA-1 it is deemed wise to move forward sooner rather than later.

When the SHA-1 hash function is used, the SigningCertificate attribute MUST be used. The SigningCertificateV2 attribute MUST be used if any algorithm other than SHA-1 is used and SHOULD NOT be used for SHA-1. Applications SHOULD recognize both attributes as long as they consider SHA-1 able to distinguish between two different certificates. (I.e. the possibility of a collision is sufficiently low.)

Four cases exist which need to be taken into account when using this attribute for correct processing:

1. Signature Validates and the hashes match: This is the success case.

2. Signature Validates and the hashes do not match: In this case the certificate contained the correct public key, the certificate containing the public key is not the one that the signer intended to be used. In this case the application should attempt a search for a different certificate with the same public key and for which the hashes match. If no such certificate can be found, this is a failure case.

3. Signature Fails Validation and the hashes match: In this case it can be assumed that the signature has been modified in some fashion. This is a failure case.

4. Signature Fails Validation and the Hashes do not match: In this case it can be either that the signature has been modified, or that the wrong certificate has been used. Applications should attempt a search for a different certificate which matches the hash value in the attribute and use the new certificate to retry the signature validation.
3. Insert new section 5.4.1 'Signing Certificate Attribute Definition Version 2'

5.4.1 Signing Certificate Attribute Definition Version 2

The signing certificate attribute is designed to prevent the simple substitution and re-issue attacks, and to allow for a restricted set of authorization certificates to be used in verifying a signature.

SigningCertificateV2 is identified by the OID:

```
id-aa-signingCertificateV2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
  member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9)
  smime(16) id-aa(2) 47 }
```

The attribute has the ASN.1 definition:

```
SigningCertificateV2 ::= SEQUENCE {
certs        SEQUENCE OF ESSCertIDv2,
policies     SEQUENCE OF PolicyInformation OPTIONAL
}
```

certs contains the list of certificates that are to be used in validating the message. The first certificate identified in the sequence of certificate identifiers MUST be the certificate used to verify the signature. The encoding of the ESSCertIDv2 for this certificate SHOULD include the issuerSerial field. If other constraints ensure that issuerAndSerialNumber will be present in the SignerInfo, the issuerSerial field MAY be omitted. The certificate identified is used during the signature verification process. If the hash of the certificate does not match the certificate used to verify the signature, the signature MUST be considered invalid.

If more than one certificate is present, subsequent certificates limit the set of authorization certificates that are used during signature validation. Authorization certificates can be either attribute certificates or normal certificates. The issuerSerial field (in the ESSCertIDv2 structure) SHOULD be present for these certificates, unless the client who is validating the signature is expected to have easy access to all the certificates required for validation. If only the signing certificate is present in the sequence, there are no restrictions on the set of authorization certificates used in validating the signature.
policies contains a sequence of policy information terms that identify those certificate policies that the signer asserts apply to the certificate, and under which the certificate should be relied upon. This value suggests a policy value to be used in the relying party's certification path validation. The definition of PolicyInformation can be found in [PKIXCERT].

If present, the SigningCertificateV2 attribute MUST be a signed attribute; it MUST NOT be an unsigned attribute. CMS defines SignedAttributes as a SET OF Attribute. A SignerInfo MUST NOT include multiple instances of the SigningCertificate attribute. CMS defines the ASN.1 syntax for the signed attributes to include attrValues SET OF AttributeValue. A SigningCertificate attribute MUST include only a single instance of AttributeValue. There MUST NOT be zero or multiple instances of AttributeValue present in the attrValues SET OF AttributeValue.
4. Insert new section 5.4.1.1 'Certificate Identification Version 2'

Insert the following text as a new section

5.4.1.1 Certificate Identification Version 2

The best way to identify certificates is an often-discussed issue. The ESSCertIDv2 structure supplies two different fields that are used for this purpose.

The hash of the entire certificate allows for a verifier to check that the certificate used in the verification process was the same certificate the signer intended. Hashes are convenient in that they are frequently used by certificate stores as a method of indexing and retrieving certificates as well. The use of the hash is required by this structure since the detection of substituted certificates is based on the fact they would map to different hash values.

The issuer/serial number pair is the method of identification of certificates used in [PKIXCERT]. That document imposes a restriction for certificates that the issuer distinguished name must be present. The issuer/serial number pair would therefore normally be sufficient to identify the correct signing certificate. (This assumes the same issuer name is not re-used from the set of trust anchors.) The issuer/serial number pair can be stored in the sid field of the SignerInfo object. However the sid field is not covered by the signature. In the cases where the issuer/serial number pair is not used in the sid or the issuer/serial number pair needs to be signed, it SHOULD be placed in the issuerSerial field of the ESSCertIDv2 structure.

Attribute certificates and additional public key certificates containing authorization information do not have an issuer/serial number pair represented anywhere in a SignerInfo object. When an attribute certificate or an additional public key certificate is not included in the SignedData object, it becomes much more difficult to get the correct set of certificates based only on a hash of the certificate. For this reason, these certificates SHOULD be identified by the IssuerSerial object.

This document defines a certificate identifier as:
ESSCertIDv2 ::= SEQUENCE {
  hashAlg            AlgorithmIdentifier DEFAULT {id-sha256},
  certHash           Hash,
  issuerSerial       IssuerSerial OPTIONAL
}

Hash ::= OCTET STRING

IssuerSerial ::= SEQUENCE {
  issuer                   GeneralNames,
  serialNumber             CertificateSerialNumber
}

The fields of ESSCertIDv2 are defined as follows:

hashAlg  contains the identifier of the algorithm used in computing
certHash.

certHash  is computed over the entire DER encoded certificate
including the signature.

issuerSerial  holds the identification of the certificate. The
issuerSerial would normally be present unless the value can be
inferred from other information (e.g. the sid field of the
SignerInfo object).

The fields of IssuerSerial are defined as follows:

issuer  contains the issuer name of the certificate. For non-
attribute certificates, the issuer MUST contain only the issuer
name from the certificate encoded in the directoryName choice of
GeneralNames. For attribute certificates, the issuer MUST contain
the issuer name field from the attribute certificate.

serialNumber  holds the serial number that uniquely identifies the
certificate for the issuer CA.
5. Insert new section 5.4.2 'Signing Certificate Attribute Definition Version 1'

5.4.2 Signing Certificate Attribute Definition Version 1

The signing certificate attribute is designed to prevent the simple substitution and re-issue attacks, and to allow for a restricted set of authorization certificates to be used in verifying a signature.

The definition of SigningCertificate is

\[
\text{SigningCertificate ::= SEQUENCE \{ \\
\text{   certs \ SEQUENCE OF ESSCertID,} \\
\text{   policies \ SEQUENCE OF PolicyInformation OPTIONAL} \\
\}}
\]

\[
\text{id-aa-signingCertificate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= \{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) smime(16) id-aa(2) 12 } \]

The first certificate identified in the sequence of certificate identifiers MUST be the certificate used to verify the signature. The encoding of the ESSCertID for this certificate SHOULD include the issuerSerial field. If other constraints ensure that issuerAndSerialNumber will be present in the SignerInfo, the issuerSerial field MAY be omitted. The certificate identified is used during the signature verification process. If the hash of the certificate does not match the certificate used to verify the signature, the signature MUST be considered invalid.

If more than one certificate is present in the sequence of ESSCertIDs, the certificates after the first one limit the set of authorization certificates that are used during signature validation. Authorization certificates can be either attribute certificates or normal certificates. The issuerSerial field (in the ESSCertID structure) SHOULD be present for these certificates, unless the client who is validating the signature is expected to have easy access to all the certificates required for validation. If only the signing certificate is present in the sequence, there are no restrictions on the set of authorization certificates used in validating the signature.

The sequence of policy information terms identifies those certificate policies that the signer asserts apply to the certificate, and under which the certificate should be relied upon. This value suggests a policy value to be used in the relying party's certification path validation.
If present, the SigningCertificate attribute MUST be a signed attribute; it MUST NOT be an unsigned attribute. CMS defines SignedAttributes as a SET OF Attribute. A SignerInfo MUST NOT include multiple instances of the SigningCertificate attribute. CMS defines the ASN.1 syntax for the signed attributes to include attrValues SET OF AttributeValue. A SigningCertificate attribute MUST include only a single instance of AttributeValue. There MUST NOT be zero or multiple instances of AttributeValue present in the attrValues SET OF AttributeValue.
6. Renumber Section 5.4.1 Certificate Identification Version 1

   Change the number on this section from 5.4.1 to 5.4.2.1

   Change the title on this section to "Certificate Identification
   Version 1".
7. Normative References


Appendix A. ASN.1 Module

Replace the ASN.1 module with this one.

ExtendedSecurityServices-2006

{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549)
  pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-ess-2006(30) }

DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::= BEGIN

IMPORTS

-- Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
  ContentType, IssuerAndSerialNumber, SubjectKeyIdentifier,
  AlgorithmIdentifier
FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840)
  rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) cms(1)}

-- PKIX Certificate and CRL Profile, Sec A.2 Implicitly Tagged Module,
-- 1988 Syntax
  PolicyInformation, CertificateSerialNumber, GeneralNames FROM
  PKIX1Implicit88 {iso(1)
    identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
    mechanisms(5) pkix(7)id-mod(0) id-pkix1-implicit(19)};

-- Extended Security Services

-- The construct "SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF" appears in several ASN.1
-- constructs in this module. A valid ASN.1 SEQUENCE can have zero or
-- more entries. The SIZE (1..MAX) construct constrains the SEQUENCE to
-- have at least one entry. MAX indicates the upper bound is unspecified.
-- Implementations are free to choose an upper bound that suits their
-- environment.

UTF8String ::= [UNIVERSAL 12] IMPLICIT OCTET STRING

-- The contents are formatted as described in [UTF8]

-- Section 2.7

ReceiptRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
  signedContentIdentifier ContentIdentifier,
  receiptsFrom ReceiptsFrom,
  receiptsTo SEQUENCE SIZE (1..ub-receiptsTo) OF GeneralNames }

ub-receiptsTo INTEGER ::= 16

id-aa-receiptRequest OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
  us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-aa(2) 1}

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ContentIdentifier ::= OCTET STRING

id-aa-contentIdentifier OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-aa(2) 7}

ReceiptsFrom ::= CHOICE {
  allOrFirstTier [0] AllOrFirstTier,
  -- formerly "allOrNone [0]AllOrNone"
  receiptList [1] SEQUENCE OF GeneralNames }

AllOrFirstTier ::= INTEGER { -- Formerly AllOrNone
  allReceipts (0),
  firstTierRecipients (1) }

-- Section 2.8

Receipt ::= SEQUENCE {
  version ESSVersion,
  contentType ContentType,
  signedContentIdentifier ContentIdentifier,
  originatorSignatureValue OCTET STRING }

id-ct-receipt OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-ct(1) 1}

ESSVersion ::= INTEGER { v1(1) }

-- Section 2.9

ContentHints ::= SEQUENCE {
  contentDescription UTF8String (SIZE (1..MAX)) OPTIONAL,
  contentType ContentType }

id-aa-contentHint OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-aa(2) 4}

-- Section 2.10

MsgSigDigest ::= OCTET STRING

id-aa-msgSigDigest OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-aa(2) 5}

-- Section 2.11

ContentReference ::= SEQUENCE {
  contentType ContentType,
signedContentIdentifier ContentIdentifier, 
originatorSignatureValue OCTET STRING }

id-aa-contentReference OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) 
   us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-aa(2) 10 }

-- Section 3.2

ESSSecurityLabel ::= SET {
   security-policy-identifier SecurityPolicyIdentifier, 
   security-classification SecurityClassification OPTIONAL, 
   privacy-mark ESSPrivacyMark OPTIONAL, 
   security-categories SecurityCategories OPTIONAL }

id-aa-securityLabel OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) 
   us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-aa(2) 2}

SecurityPolicyIdentifier ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER

SecurityClassification ::= INTEGER {
   unmarked (0),
   unclassified (1),
   restricted (2),
   confidential (3),
   secret (4),
   top-secret (5) } (0..ub-integer-options)

ub-integer-options INTEGER ::= 256

ESSPrivacyMark ::= CHOICE {
   pString     PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-privacy-mark-length)),
   utf8String  UTF8String (SIZE (1..MAX))
}

ub-privacy-mark-length INTEGER ::= 128

SecurityCategories ::= SET SIZE (1..ub-security-categories) OF 
   SecurityCategory

ub-security-categories INTEGER ::= 64

SecurityCategory ::= SEQUENCE {
   type  [0] OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
   value [1] ANY DEFINED BY type -- defined by type
}

--Note: The aforementioned SecurityCategory syntax produces identical 
--hex encodings as the following SecurityCategory syntax that is
--documented in the X.411 specification:
--
--SecurityCategory ::= SEQUENCE {
--  type [0] SECURITY-CATEGORY,
--  value [1] ANY DEFINED BY type }
--
--SECURITY-CATEGORY MACRO ::= BEGIN
--  TYPE NOTATION ::= type | empty
--  VALUE NOTATION ::= value (VALUE OBJECT IDENTIFIER)
--END
--
--Section 3.4

EquivalentLabels ::= SEQUENCE OF ESSSecurityLabel

id-aa-equivalentLabels OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
  us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-aa(2) 9}

-- Section 4.4

MLExpansionHistory ::= SEQUENCE
  SIZE (1..ub-ml-expansion-history) OF MLD ata

id-aa-mlExpandHistory OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
  us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-aa(2) 3}

ub-ml-expansion-history INTEGER ::= 64

MLData ::= SEQUENCE {
  mailListIdentifier EntityIdentifier,
  expansionTime GeneralizedTime,
  mlReceiptPolicy MLReceiptPolicy OPTIONAL }

EntityIdentifier ::= CHOICE {
  issuerAndSerialNumber IssuerAndSerialNumber,
  subjectKeyIdentifier SubjectKeyIdentifier }

MLReceiptPolicy ::= CHOICE {
  none [0] NULL,
  insteadOf [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF GeneralNames,
  inAdditionTo [2] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF GeneralNames }

-- Section 5.4

SigningCertificate ::= SEQUENCE {

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certs        SEQUENCE OF ESSCertID,
policies     SEQUENCE OF PolicyInformation OPTIONAL
}

id-aa-signingCertificate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
  member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9)
  smime(16) id-aa(2) 12 }

SigningCertificateV2 ::=  SEQUENCE {
  certs        SEQUENCE OF ESSCertIDv2,
  policies     SEQUENCE OF PolicyInformation OPTIONAL
}

id-aa-signingCertificateV2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
  member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9)
  smime(16) id-aa(2) 47 }

id-sha256  OBJECT IDENTIFIER  ::=  { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
  country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101)
  csor(3) nistalgorithm(4) hashalgs(2) 1 }

ESSCertIDv2 ::= SEQUENCE {
  hashAlgorithm           AlgorithmIdentifier DEFAULT {algorithm
    id-sha256 parameters NULL} certHash, issuerSerial
  issuerSerial             IssuerSerial OPTIONAL
}

ESSCertID ::=  SEQUENCE {
  certHash                 Hash, issuerSerial
  issuerSerial             IssuerSerial OPTIONAL
}

Hash ::= OCTET STRING -- SHA1 hash of entire certificate

IssuerSerial ::= SEQUENCE {
  issuer                   GeneralNames, serialNumber
  issuerSerial             CertificateSerialNumber
}

END -- of ExtendedSecurityServices-2006
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