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## The AES-CBC Cipher Algorithm and Its Use with IPsec

### Status of this Memo

This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements. Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state and status of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited.

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### Abstract

This document describes the use of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Cipher Algorithm in Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) Mode, with an explicit Initialization Vector (IV), as a confidentiality mechanism within the context of the IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP).

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## 1. Introduction

As the culmination of a four-year competitive process, NIST (the National Institute of Standards and Technology) has selected the AES (Advanced Encryption Standard), the successor to the venerable DES (Data Encryption Standard). The competition was an open one, with public participation and comment solicited at each step of the process. The AES [AES], formerly known as Rijndael, was chosen from a field of five finalists.

The AES selection was made on the basis of several characteristics:

- + security
- + unclassified
- + publicly disclosed
- + available royalty-free, worldwide
- + capable of handling a block size of at least 128 bits
- + at a minimum, capable of handling key sizes of 128, 192, and 256 bits
- + computational efficiency and memory requirements on a variety of software and hardware, including smart cards
- + flexibility, simplicity and ease of implementation

The AES will be the government's designated encryption cipher. The expectation is that the AES will suffice to protect sensitive (unclassified) government information until at least the next century. It is also expected to be widely adopted by businesses and financial institutions.

It is the intention of the IETF IPsec Working Group that AES will eventually be adopted as the default IPsec ESP cipher and will obtain the status of MUST be included in compliant IPsec implementations.

The remainder of this document specifies the use of the AES within the context of IPsec ESP. For further information on how the various pieces of ESP fit together to provide security services, refer to [ARCH], [ESP], and [ROAD].

### 1.1. Specification of Requirements

The keywords "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" that appear in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC-2119].

## 2. The AES Cipher Algorithm

All symmetric block cipher algorithms share common characteristics and variables, including mode, key size, weak keys, block size, and rounds. The following sections contain descriptions of the relevant characteristics of the AES cipher.

### 2.1. Mode

NIST has defined 5 modes of operation for AES and other FIPS-approved ciphers [MODES]: CBC (Cipher Block Chaining), ECB (Electronic CodeBook), CFB (Cipher FeedBack), OFB (Output FeedBack) and CTR (Counter). The CBC mode is well-defined and well-understood for symmetric ciphers, and is currently required for all other ESP ciphers. This document specifies the use of the AES cipher in CBC mode within ESP. This mode requires an Initialization Vector (IV) that is the same size as the block size. Use of a randomly generated IV prevents generation of identical ciphertext from packets which have identical data that spans the first block of the cipher algorithm's block size.

The IV is XOR'd with the first plaintext block before it is encrypted. Then for successive blocks, the previous ciphertext block is XOR'd with the current plaintext, before it is encrypted.

More information on CBC mode can be obtained in [MODES, CRYPTO-S]. For the use of CBC mode in ESP with 64-bit ciphers, see [CBC].

## 2.2. Key Size and Number of Rounds

AES supports three key sizes: 128 bits, 192 bits, and 256 bits. The default key size is 128 bits, and all implementations MUST support this key size. Implementations MAY also support key sizes of 192 bits and 256 bits.

AES uses a different number of rounds for each of the defined key sizes. When a 128-bit key is used, implementations MUST use 10 rounds. When a 192-bit key is used, implementations MUST use 12 rounds. When a 256-bit key is used, implementations MUST use 14 rounds.

## 2.3. Weak Keys

At the time of writing this document there are no known weak keys for the AES.

Some cipher algorithms have weak keys or keys that MUST not be used due to their interaction with some aspect of the cipher's definition. If weak keys are discovered for the AES, then weak keys SHOULD be checked for and discarded when using manual key management. When using dynamic key management, such as [IKE], weak key checks SHOULD NOT be performed as they are seen as an unnecessary added code complexity that could weaken the intended security [EVALUATION].

## 2.4. Block Size and Padding

The AES uses a block size of sixteen octets (128 bits).

Padding is required by the AES to maintain a 16-octet (128-bit) blocksize. Padding MUST be added, as specified in [ESP], such that the data to be encrypted (which includes the ESP Pad Length and Next Header fields) has a length that is a multiple of 16 octets.

Because of the algorithm specific padding requirement, no additional padding is required to ensure that the ciphertext terminates on a 4-octet boundary (i.e., maintaining a 16-octet blocksize guarantees that the ESP Pad Length and Next Header fields will be right aligned within a 4-octet word). Additional padding MAY be included, as specified in [ESP], as long as the 16-octet blocksize is maintained.

## 2.5. Additional Information

AES was invented by Joan Daemen from Banksys/PWI and Vincent Rijmen from ESAT-COSIC, both in Belgium, and is available world-wide on a royalty-free basis. It is not covered by any patents, and the Rijndael homepage contains the following statement: "Rijndael is

available for free. You can use it for whatever purposes you want, irrespective of whether it is accepted as AES or not." AES's description can be found in [AES]. The Rijndael homepage is: <http://www.esat.kuleuven.ac.be/~rijmen/rijndael/>.


The AES homepage, <http://www.nist.gov/aes>, contains a wealth of information about the AES, including a definitive description of the AES algorithm, performance statistics, test vectors and intellectual property information. This site also contains information on how to obtain an AES reference implementation from NIST.

## 2.6. Performance

For a comparison table of the estimated speeds of AES and other cipher algorithms, please see [PERF-1], [PERF-2], [PERF-3], or [PERF-4]. The AES homepage has pointers to other analyses.

## 3. ESP Payload

The ESP payload is made up of the IV followed by raw cipher-text. Thus the payload field, as defined in [ESP], is broken down according to the following diagram:



The IV field MUST be the same size as the block size of the cipher algorithm being used. The IV MUST be chosen at random, and MUST be unpredictable.

Including the IV in each datagram ensures that decryption of each received datagram can be performed, even when some datagrams are dropped, or datagrams are re-ordered in transit.

To avoid CBC encryption of very similar plaintext blocks in different packets, implementations MUST NOT use a counter or other low-Hamming distance source for IVs.

### 3.1. ESP Algorithmic Interactions

Currently, there are no known issues regarding interactions between the AES and other aspects of ESP, such as use of certain authentication schemes.

### 3.2. Keying Material

The minimum number of bits sent from the key exchange protocol to the ESP algorithm must be greater than or equal to the key size.

The cipher's encryption and decryption key is taken from the first <x> bits of the keying material, where <x> represents the required key size.

## 4. Test Vectors

The first 4 test cases test AES-CBC encryption. Each test case includes the key, the plaintext, and the resulting ciphertext. The values of keys and data are either hexadecimal numbers (prefixed by "0x") or ASCII character strings (surrounded by double quotes). If a value is an ASCII character string, then the AES-CBC computation for the corresponding test case DOES NOT include the trailing null character ('\0') of the string. The computed ciphertext values are all hexadecimal numbers.

The last 4 test cases illustrate sample ESP packets using AES-CBC for encryption. All data are hexadecimal numbers (not prefixed by "0x").

These test cases were verified using 2 independent implementations: the NIST AES-CBC reference implementation and an implementation provided by the authors of the Rijndael algorithm (<http://csrc.nist.gov/encryption/aes/rijndael/rijndael-unix-refc.tar>).

Case #1: Encrypting 16 bytes (1 block) using AES-CBC with 128-bit key

Key : 0x06a9214036b8a15b512e03d534120006  
IV : 0x3dafba429d9eb430b422da802c9fac41  
Plaintext : "Single block msg"  
Ciphertext: 0xe353779c1079aeb82708942dbe77181a

Case #2: Encrypting 32 bytes (2 blocks) using AES-CBC with 128-bit key

Key : 0xc286696d887c9aa0611bbb3e2025a45a  
IV : 0x562e17996d093d28ddb3ba695a2e6f58  
Plaintext : 0x000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f  
101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f  
Ciphertext: 0xd296cd94c2cccf8a3a863028b5e1dc0a  
7586602d253cfff91b8266bea6d61ab1

Case #3: Encrypting 48 bytes (3 blocks) using AES-CBC with 128-bit key

Key : 0x6c3ea0477630ce21a2ce334aa746c2cd

IV : 0xc782dc4c098c66cbd9cd27d825682c81

Plaintext : "This is a 48-byte message (exactly 3 AES blocks)"

Ciphertext: 0xd0a02b3836451753d493665d33f0e886  
2dea54cdb293abc7506939276772f8d5  
021c19216bad525c8579695d83ba2684

Case #4: Encrypting 64 bytes (4 blocks) using AES-CBC with 128-bit key

Key : 0x56e47a38c5598974bc46903dba290349

IV : 0x8ce82eefbea0da3c44699ed7db51b7d9

Plaintext : 0xa0a1a2a3a4a5a6a7a8a9aaabacadaeaf  
b0b1b2b3b4b5b6b7b8b9babbbcbdbef  
c0c1c2c3c4c5c6c7c8c9cacbcccdcecf  
d0d1d2d3d4d5d6d7d8d9dadbdcddeedf

Ciphertext: 0xc30e32ffedc0774e6aff6af0869f71aa  
0f3af07a9a31a9c684db207eb0ef8e4e  
35907aa632c3ffdf868bb7b29d3d46ad  
83ce9f9a102ee99d49a53e87f4c3da55

Case #5: Sample transport-mode ESP packet (ping 192.168.123.100)

Key: 90d382b4 10eeba7a d938c46c e1a82bf

SPI: 4321

Source address: 192.168.123.3

Destination address: 192.168.123.100

Sequence number: 1

IV: e96e8c08 ab465763 fd098d45 dd3ff893

Original packet:

IP header (20 bytes): 45000054 08f20000 4001f9fe c0a87b03 c0a87b64

Data (64 bytes):

08000ebd a70a0000 8e9c083d b95b0700 08090a0b 0c0d0e0f 10111213 14151617  
18191a1b 1c1d1e1f 20212223 24252627 28292a2b 2c2d2e2f 30313233 34353637

Augment data with:

Padding: 01020304 05060708 090a0b0c 0d0e

Pad length: 0e

Next header: 01 (ICMP)

Pre-encryption Data with padding, pad length and next header (80 bytes):

08000ebd a70a0000 8e9c083d b95b0700 08090a0b 0c0d0e0f 10111213 14151617  
18191a1b 1c1d1e1f 20212223 24252627 28292a2b 2c2d2e2f 30313233 34353637  
01020304 05060708 090a0b0c 0d0e0e01

Post-encryption packet with SPI, Sequence number, IV:  
IP header: 4500007c 08f20000 4032f9a5 c0a87b03 c0a87b64  
SPI/Seq #: 00004321 00000001  
IV: e96e8c08 ab465763 fd098d45 dd3ff893  
Encrypted Data (80 bytes):  
f663c25d 325c18c6 a9453e19 4e120849 a4870b66 cc6b9965 330013b4 898dc856  
a4699e52 3a55db08 0b59ec3a 8e4b7e52 775b07d1 db34ed9c 538ab50c 551b874a  
a269add0 47ad2d59 13ac19b7 cfbad4a6

Case #6: Sample transport-mode ESP packet  
(ping -p 77 -s 20 192.168.123.100)  
Key: 90d382b4 10eeba7a d938c46c ecla82bf  
SPI: 4321  
Source address: 192.168.123.3  
Destination address: 192.168.123.100  
Sequence number: 8  
IV: 69d08df7 d203329d b093fc49 24e5bd80

Original packet:  
IP header (20 bytes): 45000030 08fe0000 4001fa16 c0a87b03 c0a87b64  
Data (28 bytes):  
0800b5e8 a80a0500 a69c083d 0b660e00 77777777 77777777 77777777

Augment data with:  
Padding: 0102  
Pad length: 02  
Next header: 01 (ICMP)

Pre-encryption Data with padding, pad length and next header (32 bytes):  
0800b5e8 a80a0500 a69c083d 0b660e00 77777777 77777777 77777777 01020201

Post-encryption packet with SPI, Sequence number, IV:  
IP header: 4500004c 08fe0000 4032f9c9 c0a87b03 c0a87b64  
SPI/Seq #: 00004321 00000008  
IV: 69d08df7 d203329d b093fc49 24e5bd80  
Encrypted Data (32 bytes):  
f5199588 1ec4e0c4 488987ce 742e8109 689bb379 d2d750c0 d915dca3 46a89f75

Case #7: Sample tunnel-mode ESP packet (ping 192.168.123.200)  
Key: 01234567 89abcdef 01234567 89abcdef  
SPI: 8765  
Source address: 192.168.123.3  
Destination address: 192.168.123.200  
Sequence number: 2  
IV: f4e76524 4f6407ad f13dc138 0f673f37



Original packet:

IP header (20 bytes): 45000054 09040000 4001f988 c0a87b03 c0a87bc8  
Data (64 bytes):  
08009f76 a90a0100 b49c083d 02a20400 08090a0b 0c0d0e0f 10111213 14151617  
18191a1b 1c1d1e1f 20212223 24252627 28292a2b 2c2d2e2f 30313233 34353637

Augment data with:

Padding: 01020304 05060708 090a  
Pad length: 0a  
Next header: 04 (IP-in-IP)

Pre-encryption Data with original IP header, padding, pad length and  
next header (96 bytes):

45000054 09040000 4001f988 c0a87b03 c0a87bc8 08009f76 a90a0100 b49c083d  
02a20400 08090a0b 0c0d0e0f 10111213 14151617 18191a1b 1c1d1e1f 20212223  
24252627 28292a2b 2c2d2e2f 30313233 34353637 01020304 05060708 090a0a04

Post-encryption packet with SPI, Sequence number, IV:

IP header: 4500008c 09050000 4032f91e c0a87b03 c0a87bc8  
SPI/Seq #: 00008765 00000002  
IV: f4e76524 4f6407ad f13dc138 0f673f37  
Encrypted Data (96 bytes):  
773b5241 a4c44922 5e4f3ce5 ed611b0c 237ca96c f74a9301 3c1b0ea1 a0cf70f8  
e4ecaec7 8ac53aad 7a0f022b 859243c6 47752e94 a859352b 8a4d4d2d ecd136e5  
c177f132 ad3fbfb2 201ac990 4c74ee0a 109e0ca1 e4dfe9d5 a100b842 f1c22f0d

Case #8: Sample tunnel-mode ESP packet  
(ping -p ff -s 40 192.168.123.200)  
Key: 01234567 89abcdef 01234567 89abcdef  
SPI: 8765  
Source address: 192.168.123.3  
Destination address: 192.168.123.200  
Sequence number: 5  
IV: 85d47224 b5f3dd5d 2101d4ea 8dffab22

Original packet:

IP header (20 bytes): 45000044 090c0000 4001f990 c0a87b03 c0a87bc8  
Data (48 bytes):  
0800d63c aa0a0200 c69c083d a3de0300 ffffffff ffffffff ffffffff ffffffff  
ffffffff ffffffff ffffffff ffffffff

Augment data with:

Padding: 01020304 05060708 090a  
Pad length: 0a  
Next header: 04 (IP-in-IP)

Pre-encryption Data with original IP header, padding, pad length and  
next header (80 bytes):

```
45000044 090c0000 4001f990 c0a87b03 c0a87bc8 0800d63c aa0a0200 c69c083d
a3de0300 ffffffff ffffffff ffffffff ffffffff ffffffff ffffffff ffffffff
ffffffff 01020304 05060708 090a0a04
```

Post-encryption packet with SPI, Sequence number, IV:

IP header: 4500007c 090d0000 4032f926 c0a87b03 c0a87bc8

SPI/Seq #: 00008765 00000005

IV: 85d47224 b5f3dd5d 2101d4ea 8dffab22

Encrypted Data (80 bytes):

```
15b92683 819596a8 047232cc 00f7048f e45318e1 1f8a0f62 ede3c3fc 61203bb5
0f980a08 c9843fd3 alb06d5c 07ff9639 b7eb7dfb 3512e5de 435e7207 ed971ef3
d2726d9b 5ef6affc 6d17a0de cbb13892
```

## 5. IKE Interactions

### 5.1. Phase 1 Identifier

For Phase 1 negotiations, IANA has assigned an Encryption Algorithm ID of 7 for AES-CBC.

### 5.2. Phase 2 Identifier

For Phase 2 negotiations, IANA has assigned an ESP Transform Identifier of 12 for ESP\_AES.

### 5.3. Key Length Attribute

Since the AES allows variable key lengths, the Key Length attribute MUST be specified in both a Phase 1 exchange [IKE] and a Phase 2 exchange [DOI].

### 5.4. Hash Algorithm Considerations

A companion competition, to select the successor to SHA-1, the widely-used hash algorithm, recently concluded. The resulting hashes, called SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-512 [SHA2-1, SHA2-2] are capable of producing output of three different lengths (256, 384 and 512 bits), sufficient for the generation (within IKE) and authentication (within ESP) of the three AES key sizes (128, 192 and 256 bits).

However, HMAC-SHA-1 [HMAC-SHA] and HMAC-MD5 [HMAC-MD5] are currently considered of sufficient strength to serve both as IKE generators of 128-bit AES keys and as ESP authenticators for AES encryption using 128-bit keys.

## 6. Security Considerations

Implementations are encouraged to use the largest key sizes they can when taking into account performance considerations for their particular hardware and software configuration. Note that encryption necessarily impacts both sides of a secure channel, so such consideration must take into account not only the client side, but the server as well. However, a key size of 128 bits is considered secure for the foreseeable future.

For more information regarding the necessary use of random IV values, see [CRYPTO-B].

For further security considerations, the reader is encouraged to read [AES].

## 7. IANA Considerations

IANA has assigned Encryption Algorithm ID 7 to AES-CBC.  
IANA has assigned ESP Transform Identifier 12 to ESP\_AES.

## 8. Intellectual Property Rights Statement

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## 10. Acknowledgments

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