



SECURITY IN 5G INTER-NETWORK SIGNALLING

Stefan Schröder
Telekom Security



LIFE IS FOR SHARING.



SECURITY IN 5G INTER-NETWORK ~~SIGNALLING~~ API CALLS

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5G SERVICE BASED ARCHITECTURE (SBA)

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- 01** Where we are: Current situation
 - 02** Where we go: Network service bus
 - 03** What we send: The 5GC protocol stack
 - 04** What we want: SA3's goals for SBA
 - 05** What we hear: Agenda for today
-

01 WHERE WE ARE:
CURRENT SITUATION

MARCH 2018: ENISA STUDY ON SIGNALLING SECURITY

5G-Mobilfunk: E
vor "extremen"

30.03.2018 15:36 Uhr – Stefan

5G is a sec
Written by Ja



NEWS

Europe warns 5G IoT deployments fundamentally insecure

By Rene Millman - April 3, 2018

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5G security needs to be tightened as important lessons still haven't been learned from previous technology generations, warns ENISA report.

(Bild: The European Union Agen security flaws of yesteryea

Some citations from the study:

- “Wild West” running on legacy infrastructure
- Consider revising the current legal landscape
- [in 5G] grace period between vulnerability discovery and real exploitation will become much shorter compared to SS7 and Diameter


MAIN IDEAS OF REFERENCE POINTS

- Point-to-point communication within the core network
- Well-defined interfaces for certain data exchanges
- Pre-5G: different signalling protocols (MAP, RADIUS, GTP-C, ...)
- Monolithic conception of network functions
- Tight coupling of network functions, statically configured security
- Fine-grained network segmentation possible



02 WHERE WE GO:
NETWORK SERVICE BUS

3GPP RELEASE 15 – SERVICE-BASED REPRESENTATION






NSSF: Network Slice Selection Function
 UDM: Unified Data Management
 AUSF: Authentication Server Function
 PCF: Policy Control function
 AMF: Access and Mobility Management Function
 SMF: Session Management Function
 UPF: User plane Function
 (R)AN: (Radio) Access Network
 UE: User Equipment.
 DN: Data network, e.g. operator services, Internet access or 3rd party services.

AF: Application Function
 DSF: Data Storage network function.
 NEF: Network Exposure Function
 NRF: NF Repository Function

MAIN IDEAS OF SBA

- Replace signalling messages by API calls
- Core network = logically-uniform service bus
- No longer point-to-point communication, but „everyone-to-everyone“
- Well-defined interfaces for available services on uniform protocol stack
- Network Functions in the cloud
- Consumer/Producer model: easily deployable NF building-blocks
- Basic NF service interactions:
 - Request/Response
 - Subscribe/Notify (Me)
 - Subscribe/Notify (Someone else)



03 WHAT WE SEND: **THE 5GC PROTOCOL STACK**

THE 5GC PROTOCOL STACK

ACCORDING TO 3GPP TS 29.50X

TCP

- De-facto industry standard for HTTP web services
- More widespread than SCTP
- Redundancy and load balancing via “cloudification magic”

HTTP/2

- Binary framing
- Multiplexing of requests over the same connection
- Header compression

JSON

- Serialization data format for the 3GPP 5GC protocol information elements (IE)
- De-facto industry standard for web services
- Simple, straightforward specification, immense tooling



RELATED CONCEPTS

ADOPTED BY 3GPP ARCHITECTURE AND CORE NETWORK GROUPS

RESTful services

- Client/Server communication
- URL-addressable resources
- Uniform HTTP-interface
- Statelessness + Cacheable responses (?)

OpenAPI specification (aka Swagger)

- RESTful API description language
- Open source collaborative project by the Linux Foundation
- JSON object, represented either in JSON or YAML format

Two HTTP client-server pairs

- Necessary in Subscribe/Notify scenarios
- Subscriber to inform Notifier about receiving endpoint



PROTOCOL EVOLUTION





EXAMPLE: UPDATE LOCATION REQUEST

2G

3G

4G

5G



04 WHAT WE WANT:
SA3 GOALS FOR SBA

SECURITY GOAL #1 FOR RELEASE 15

Message origin authentication

“Who is the real sender?”

Message protection (integrity / confidentiality)

“Was the message modified/read?”

Standardize all of these
aspects in 5G

Cross-layer anti-spoofing enforcement

“Do identities used on different protocol layers
all belong to the same sender?”


Message content authorization

“Is the consumer legitimized to request or be
subscribed to a specific service?”



SECURITY GOAL #3 FOR 3GPP RELEASE 15

A 5G signalling edge proxy is required to protect traffic crossing a security domain boundary, and thus needs to be included in the architecture.



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SEPP: Security Edge Protection Proxy

05 WHAT WE'LL HEAR:
AGENDA FOR TODAY

AGENDA PART 1

09:00 **Session 2: Security in 5G Inter-Network Signalling**
Session Chair: Stefan Schroeder, T-Systems

09:00 Presentation on SBA: introduction of the topic and current status in SA3
Stefan Schroeder, T-Systems

09:20 5G Inter-PLMN security: The trade-off between security and the existing IPX
business model
Ewout Pronk, KPN on behalf of GSMA Diameter End to End Security Subgroup

09:40 Secure Interworking between networks in 5G Service Based Architecture
Silke Holtmanns, Nokia Bell Labs

10:00 **Coffee Break**

AGENDA PART 2

10:30	Session 2: Security in 5G Inter-Network Signalling (continuation) Session Chair: Stefan Schroeder, T-Systems
	10:30 Security Best Practises using RESTful APIs Sven Walther, CA Technologies
	10:50 Identifying and Managing the Issues around 5G Interconnect Security Stephen Buck, Evolved Intelligence
	11:10 Zero Trust Security Posture in 5G Architecture Galina Pildush, Palo Alto Networks
	11:30 Questions & Answers with all Session 2 Speakers and the Audience led by Stefan Schroeder, T-Systems
12:00	Workshop Wrap up: 5G Phase 1 Conclusions and Outlook Towards Phase 2 Stefan Schroeder, T-Systems – Bengt Sahlin, Ericsson
12:30	Close of the event - Lunch Break

