

Distributed NFV Attestation and VNF Supply Chain Trustworthiness and Integrity


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The Vision

Trustworthy Infrastructure for Critical 5G Applications



Key results

- Machine Learning based Network Anomaly detection and mitigation
- End to End Attestation and Trusted NFV, Edge and IoT
- Integrated, Multi-Faceted Security Approach

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The Trusted Computing Base

- ▶ Trusted Platform Module
- ▶ Secure, Measured and Trusted Boot (UEFI, tboot, TXT, SRTM, DRTM)
- ▶ Run-Time Integrity Checking (Linux IMA/EMA, SELinux)
- ▶ CPU Enclaves & Memory Encryption (Intel SGX, Arm TrustZone)
- ▶ Remote Attestation

So, what's the problem?

- ▶ Works well in the core NFV, but not Edge, IoT
- ▶ Attestation is crude, brutal and centralised
- ▶ ... VNF/VM/device production/distribution is not centralised
- ▶ Global [VNF/VM] Identities
- ▶ ...and more

The Role of Ledger/Blockchain...

- ▶ Ledger Semantics - fits with the [VNF/IoT/Element] supply chain
- ▶ Distributed, Auditable, Untamperable, Reliable, Resilient
- ▶ Notarisation *and* History (eg: VNFD & measures, operations)
- ▶ Global IDs (cf: Ethereum Contract Addresses)
- ▶ PKI, OpenStack, TCB integration, ie: workload orchestration
- ▶ Integrity: Signing **and** Measurement
- ▶ Revocation is 'easier'
- ▶ Trust Graph
- ▶ Performance

Demonstration

