

Quantum Computing for Business Executives

13 February 2023 - 9th ETSI-IQC Quantum-Safe Cryptography Workshop - Michele Mosca



UNIVERSITY OF
WATERLOO

IQC

Institute for
Quantum
Computing

PERIMETER



INSTITUTE FOR THEORETICAL PHYSICS

evolution 

How can we entrust information and tasks to untrusted systems?




Quantum Changes what is “Secure”

Message, M

Buy 10,000 shares

Encryption key, k



CipherText, (k,M)

Meet me at midnight

Decryption key, k



Decrypted message, M

Buy 10,000 shares

Quantum Changes Everything







Key
Establishment

Symmetric
Encryption

Authentication

New Paradigm

Each classical configuration has a corresponding quantum amplitude


Number of bits	Possible configurations	What are the possible configurations?
1	2	
2	$2^2 = 4$	
8 = 1 byte	$2^8 = 256$	 etc
10	$2^{10} = 1024$	Far too many to show
1,000,000 = 1 megabit	$2^{1,000,000}$	

New Paradigm

Number of qubits	Amplitudes to track	Classical bits to keep track of with non-zero amplitudes
1	2	2
2	2^2	2^2
3	2^3	$2^3 = 8 \rightarrow 1$ byte
10	2^{10}	$2^{10} = 1,024 \rightarrow \sim 1$ kilobit
20	2^{20}	$2^{20} = 1,048,576 \rightarrow \sim 1$ megabit
40	2^{40}	$2^{40} = 1,099,511,627,776 \rightarrow \sim 1$ terabit

If we use k bits of precision to store a single amplitude, we need approximately $k 2^N$ bits to describe the state of N qubits:
exponential growth (in the number of qubits)

Quantum brings immense power



Material and pharmaceutical design



Optimization



Sensing and measuring



Secure communication




New innovations



Are You Quantum Ready?

- Do you understand what the technologies are capable of and their readiness levels?
- Do you understand how the new capabilities impact your organization or sector?
- Do you have a plan to benefit from the disruptive capabilities?
- **Do you have a plan to mitigate any quantum threats?**



Execution is
90% Planning
10% Doing

— Kathleen Taylor, Chair of the Board, RBC

Classical Paradigm

Encrypting and authenticating is easy (e.g. multiplying numbers)

Code breaking (e.g. factoring large numbers) is hard

Quantum Paradigm


Encrypting and authenticating is easy

Breaking today's public key cryptography (i.e. factoring large numbers, finding discrete logarithms) is **EASY**




Vulnerabilities are exploited in many ways

- (D)DOS
- Ransomware
- Spyware
- Identify theft
- Cryptojacking
- Stolen data
- Data leaks
- Shutdown of infrastructure
- Etc.



Vulnerabilities, from bad to worse



When do we need to start?

As you plan your migration to quantum-safe protocols, consider:

Security shelf-life (x years)

Migration time (y years)

Collapse time (z years)

Migration time	Security shelf-life
Collapse time	

If $x+y$ approaches z , act now!

Plan for security and resilience

Challenge

Critical infrastructure may fail and no quick fix exists

Data must remain confidential over time
(record now, decrypt later)

Rushed preparations are expensive, disruptive,
vulnerable to mistakes

Society could lose trust in tools and institutions
underpinning our digital economy

Quantum computing potential is restricted due to risk

Upgraded algorithms protecting critical systems can be
broken mathematically

Mitigation

→ Make sure $y < z$

→ Make sure $x + y < z$

→ Avoid the need to compress y ;
All of the above

→ All of the above

→ All of the above

→ Agility, defense-in-depth,
methods not susceptible to
cryptanalysis

Our luck may run out

The cryptographic “breaks” in the modern era have generally

- not been feasible in the short term (so there was time to react), or
- not been on widely deployed algorithms.

The stakes have grown astronomically, and continue to grow.




QRA Methodology

- **Phase 1:** Document current cryptographic protection
- **Phase 2:** Research and estimate timelines for both quantum computers and quantum-safe cryptography
- **Phase 3:** Estimate collapse time, “Z”
- **Phase 4:** Identify asset lifetime, “X”, and quantum-safe transformation time, “y”
- **Phase 5:** Calculate quantum risk,
 - $(x + y > z ?)$
- **Phase 6:** Prioritize your quantum-safe migration steps



CFDIR Quantum Safe Journey

Quantum Readiness Program Timeline



CFDIR - Canadian National Quantum-Readiness:
Best Practices and Guidelines

Must also Prepare Future Platforms and Tools



QUANTUM-PROOFING THE BLOCKCHAIN

Vlad Gheorghiu, Sergey Gorbunov, Michele Mosca, and Bill Munson

University of Waterloo

November 2017

A BLOCKCHAIN RESEARCH INSTITUTE BIG IDEA WHITEPAPER





In collaboration
with Deloitte

WORLD
ECONOMIC
FORUM

Transitioning to a Quantum-Secure Economy

WHITE PAPER
SEPTEMBER 2022


Collapse Time Impacted by:

- best known algorithms for breaking today's public key cryptography
- best known optimizations to these algorithms, including optimizations customized to specific architectures
- architecture details of quantum computing platforms (like connectivity)
- best known fault-tolerant quantum error correction
- currently available tools and their performance benchmarks, like error rates

Migration time	Security shelf-life
Collapse time	

Example of Progress

Using state-of-the-art
“conventional” surface-code
methods, with reasonable
assumptions



the open journal for quantum science

How to factor 2048 bit RSA integers in 8 hours using 20 million noisy qubits


Craig Gidney¹ and Martin Ekerå^{2,3}

¹Google Inc., Santa Barbara, California 93117, USA
²KTH Royal Institute of Technology, SE-100 44 Stockholm, Sweden
³Swedish NCSA, Swedish Armed Forces, SE-107 85 Stockholm, Sweden

Published: 2021-04-15, volume 5, page 433
Eprint: [arXiv:1905.09749v3](https://arxiv.org/abs/1905.09749v3)
Doi: <https://doi.org/10.22331/q-2021-04-15-433>
Citation: Quantum 5, 433 (2021).

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Less “conventional” alternatives





Featured in Physics
Editors' Suggestion

Factoring 2048-bit RSA Integers in 177 Days with 13 436 Qubits and a Multimode Memory

Élie Gouzien and Nicolas Sangouard
Phys. Rev. Lett. **127**, 140503 – Published 28 September 2021

Physics See synopsis: [Far Fewer Qubits Required for “Quantum Memory” Quantum Computers](#)



Cornell University

Quantum Physics

arXiv:2211.09319 (quant-ph)
[Submitted on 17 Nov 2022]

Beating the break-even point with a discrete-variable-encoded logical qubit

Zhongchu Ni, Sai Li, Xiaowei Deng, Yanyan Cai, Libo Zhang, Weting Wang, Zhen-Biao Yang, Haifeng Yu, Fei Yan, Song Liu, Chang-Ling Zou, Luyan Sun, Shi-Biao Zheng, Yuan Xu, Dapeng Yu



Cornell University

Quantum Physics

arXiv:2211.09116 (quant-ph)
[Submitted on 16 Nov 2022]

Real-time quantum error correction beyond break-even

V. V. Sivak, A. Eickbusch, B. Royer, S. Singh, I. Tsioutsios, S. Ganjam, A. Miao, B. L. Brock, A. Z. Ding, L. Frunzio, S. M. Girvin, R. J. Schoelkopf, M. H. Devoret

Breaking RSA with near-term devices??

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Quantum technologies [+ Add to myFT](#)

Chinese researchers claim to find way to break encryption using quantum computers

Experts assess whether method outlined in scientific paper could be a sooner-than-expected turning point in the technology



A silicon wafer of quantum computer chips made by Hitachi © Yoshio Tsunoda/AFLO

<https://www.ft.com/content/b15680c0-cf31-448d-9eb6-b30426c29b8b>

nature

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NEWS | 06 January 2023

Are quantum computers about to break online privacy?

A new algorithm is probably not efficient enough to crack current encryption keys – but that's no reason for complacency, researchers say.

[Davide Castelvecchi](#)



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<https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-023-00017-0>

Status of Quantum Computer Development



Bundesamt
für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik

Studie: Entwicklungsstand Quantencomputer V1.2

Datum 18.08.2020

Next Major Milestone: Fault-Tolerant Logical Qubits

IBM Just Committed to Having a Functioning 1,000 Qubit Quantum Computer by 2023

David Nield 9/17/2020



We're still a long way from realising the full potential of quantum computing, but scientists are making progress all the time – and as a sign of what might be coming, IBM now says it expects to have a 1,000 qubit machine up and running by 2023.



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IonQ says its record-breaking quantum computer is most powerful ever

TECHNOLOGY 1 October 2020

By Leah Crane




The ion trap at the heart of IonQ's quantum computer (via IonQ, Inc.)




2022 OPINION-BASED ESTIMATES OF THE CUMULATIVE PROBABILITY OF A DIGITAL QUANTUM COMPUTER ABLE TO BREAK RSA-2048 IN 24 HOURS, AS FUNCTION OF TIMEFRAME

Estimates of the cumulative probability of a cryptographically-relevant quantum computer in time: range between average of an optimistic (top value) or pessimistic (bottom value) interpretation of the estimates indicated by the respondents.


[*Shaded grey area corresponds to the 25-year period, not considered in the questionnaire.]



Tools: “Post-quantum” and quantum cryptography



True Randomness




<https://evolutionq.com/qrng-report-2021.html>




New quantum feature: Eavesdropper detectability

Enables key establishment without a computational assumption. Known as Quantum Key Distribution (QKD).


Symmetric Encryption



Key Establishment



Authentication



Ongoing Work to Develop Standards and Certifications for These Tools

9th ETSI/IQC Quantum Safe Cryptography workshop

Sophia Antipolis, France

Free of charge

#QuantumSafeCryptography

13-15 February 2023

Register now

Contact

Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik

Migration zu Post-Quanten-Kryptografie

Handlungsempfehlungen des BSI

Stand: August 2020



NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology Information Technology Laboratory

Computer Security Division Computer Security Resource Center


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Post-Quantum Cryptography Project

Documents

POST-QUANTUM CRYPTO PROJECT

NEWS - August 2, 2016: The National Institute of Standards and Technology





Call to Action

- Establish quantum-readiness team within your organization with broad executive support.
- Leverage available “best practices” and contribute new findings back to the community.
- Support the vendor ecosystem we will all rely on. Testing solutions. Deploying sooner where risk equation calls for it.
- Engage with broader ecosystem (supply chain, third parties, standards, etc.) to identify key challenges that need to be tackled together.

Thank You!

Comments, questions and feedback are very welcome.

Michele Mosca

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Co-founder, softwareQ Inc. softwareq.ca

Cybersecurity Risk

The World Economic Forum cites **cybercrime** and **cyber insecurity** as one of the top 10 global Risks in both the short and long-term.

2 years



10 years

