

ETSI/IQC Quantum Safe Cryptography Event

Firmware integrity in the quantum age – How to prepare against threats of quantum computing now

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Security is essential








Discrete TPM, key root of trust for multiple applications


What a TPM does

- Offers a standardized solution
- Allows trusted and secured communication
- > Protects exchanged valuable data
- Supports the latest security requirements
- Is updatable, particularly "in the field"



Forecasted markets for discrete TPM


A stable base market and significant growth in other segments



2023-02-15



Devices with over 10 years of lifecycle must be prepared for the quantum computing age now





Infineon TPM: First steps into the world of quantum computing

OPTIGA™ TPM SLB 9672:


The first TPM on the market with a **PQC protected** firmware update mechanism.






OPTIGA™ TPM SLB 9672, a future-proof TPM

A PQC protected firmware update mechanism is essential for the security over the entire operational lifetime of a TPM





Quantum computers, a threat to currently known crypto algorithms



* Quantum-Resistant Cryptography by Ericsson Security Research: <u>https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/2112/2112.00399.pdf</u> NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography FAQs: <u>https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/post-quantum-cryptography/faqs</u>

NIST SP 800-208: "Recommendation for <u>Stateful Hash-Based Signature</u> Schemes"

- > Date published: October 2020
- > Included algorithms: LMS, XMSS
- > Hierarchical multi-level variants: HSS, XMSS^{MT}
- > Hash functions: SHA-256 and SHAKE256
- > Limited number of signatures: $(2^{10} 2^{60})$
- > Recommended for firmware updates
- > 128-bit post-quantum security

Advantages

- > Well understood
- > Fast verification
- > "Small" key/signature size

Drawbacks

- > (Very) slow key generation
- > State **must not** be reused!
- > Number of signatures limited




		[Bytes]			[hash calls]			[seconds]		
#signatures	variant	public key	secret key	signature	KeyGen	Sign	Verify	KeyGen	Sign	Verify
2^10	XMSS-SHA2_10_256	64	1.373	2.500	1.238.016	5.725	1.149	149	0,69	0,14
2^16	XMSS-SHA2_16_256	64	2.093	2.692	79.000.000	9.163	1.155	9.480	1,10	0,14
2^20	XMSS-SHA2_20_256	64	2.573	2.820	1.268.000.000	11.455	1.159	152.160	1,37	0,14
	XMSSMT-SHA2_20/2_256	64	5.998	4.963	2.476.032	7.227	2.298	297	0,87	0,28
	XMSSMT-SHA2_20/4_256	64	10.938	9.251	154.752	4.170	4.576	19	0,50	0,55
2^40	XMSSMT-SHA2_40/2_256	64	9.600	5.605	2.535.000.000	13.417	2.318	304.200	1,61	0,28
	XMSSMT-SHA2_40/4_256	64	15.252	9.893	4.952.064	7.227	4.596	594	0,87	0,55
	XMSSMT-SHA2_40/8_256	64	24.516	18.469	309.504	4.170	9.152	37	0,50	1,10
2^60	XMSSMT-SHA2_60/3_256	64	16.629	8.392	3.803.000.000	13.417	3.477	456.360	1,61	0,42
	XMSSMT-SHA2_60/6_256	64	24.507	14.824	7.428.096	7.227	6.894	891	0,87	0,83
	XMSSMT-SHA2_60/12_256	64	38.095	27.688	464.256	4.170	13.728	56	0,50	1,65

> @100 MHz, 12000 cycles for 3 SHA-256 blocks (openssl, 32-bit ARM), secret key/sign using BDS algorithm



Quantum-resistant update package generation @ update authority

Update authorities manage the valid XMSS keys, including the state (counter) and backups. Then it provides secured operations and allows clear business continuity.




1) Infineon Java Card




Quantum-resistant update package processing @ OPTIGA™ TPM

In the field, the OPTIGA[™] TPM SLB 9672 checks the PQC protected XMSS signature and consequently validates (or not) the transferred payload.





Crypto agility



Challenge: migration and agility

- RSA and ECC are used almost everywhere (big investment)
- > Integration of new crypto into old protocols
- > Need for flexible replacement of crypto
- > Ship today and update cryptography later
- > The hardware needs to support PQC
- > Hybrid requirements lead to cost increase
- The firmware update mechanism is essential to enable long-term security



Part of your life. Part of tomorrow.