

ETSI/IQC Quantum Safe Cryptography Event

# The effects of Dilithium on QUIC's performance

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## Background: Dilithium's Impact on TLS performance

- PQ key exchange will affect handshakes, but not detrimentally [CECPQ2] [iacr19-1447] [CON20]
- Authentication will have more impact [NDSS20] [CF21]
- Size of "authentication data" increases significantly [CSCML22]



Takeaway: Slowdowns by Dilithium or any other PQ signature algorithm...



# Intuitions about Dilithium's Impact on QUIC?

• QUIC's PQ

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- keys grow to 1-2KB (w. Kyber) and
- "authentication data" to 17+ KB.
- Higher total loss probability [iacr19-1447]
- Extra Round-trip due to the ~4KB Amplification Window [CSCML22]
- Extra Round-trip due to the ~15KB Initial Congestion Window [CON20]
- Unacceptable performance at the "tails" for >10KB of "authentication data" [CF21]
- Amplification Reflection risk





## **QUIC's Amplification Protection**



## Preliminary Experimental Results - QUIC connection time (60ms RTT)

QUIC connect time (ms) - Connect scenario - 60ms RTT



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## **Solution Options**

- Artificially inflate the Client request
- Trim down "authentication data" by
  - caching CA certificates [CSCML22] [tls-scas] or
  - using session resumption
- Increase the Amplification Protection Window
  - at the cost of increasing the amplification factor
- Use Address validation tokens

## **About Address Validation Tokens**

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QUIC will see performance slowdowns from Dilithium or other PQ signatures.

We need to research and decide what to do with QUIC's

- Size of the authentication data
- Amplification Protection
- Initial Congestion Window

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### Thank you!

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