

Single-photon Metrology for testing the implementation security of QKD systems and components

Dr. Alice Meda



WHY METROLOGY?




For QKD **technology** to become a viable real-world solution, **end-users need confidence in it**

QKD is theoretically secure but **devices are far from theoretical models**. Real systems are vulnerable to side channel attacks.

Table 1 – List of attacks against a typical QKD system and respective countermeasures. The acronyms in the table are listed at the end of the paper.

| SECURITY ISSUE | DESCRIPTION | COUNTERMEASURES |
|---|--|---|
| Trojan-horse attack | Eve probes the QKD equipment with light to gain information about the device settings | privacy amplification (PA), isolators, filters |
| Multi-photon emission | When more than one photon is emitted in a pulse, information is redundantly encoded on multiple photons | PA, characterisation, decoy states, SARG04 and other protocols |
| Imperfect encoding | Initial states do not conform to the protocol | PA, characterisation |
| Phase correlation between signal pulses | Non-phase-randomised pulses leak more info to Eve, decoy states fail | phase randomisation, PA |
| Bright-light attack | Eve manipulates the photon detectors by sending bright-light to them | active monitoring, measurement device independent QKD (MDI-QKD) |
| Efficiency mismatch and time-shift attack | Eve can control, at least partially, which detector is to click, gaining information on the encoded bit | MDI-QKD, detector symmetrisation |
| Back-flash attack | Eve can learn which detector clicked and hence knows the bit | isolators, MDI-QKD, detector symmetrisation |
| Manipulation of Local Oscillator reference | In continuous variable QKD (CV-QKD), the local oscillator (LO) can be tampered with by Eve if it is sent on a communications channel | Generate LO at the receiver. Phase reloading, i.e. only synchronise the phase of LO |



An Industry Specification Group (ISG) of the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) has been installed from October 2008 to **address standardization issues in QKD**, to **support the commercialization** of QKD devices on various levels and stages.


www.etsi.org/technologies/quantum-key-distribution

Implementation security: to **test real equipment** and to estimate how much information such equipment leaks to a potential adversary

SI Traceability in quantum photonics

Quantum Radiometry results necessary to the standardization framework for providing SI traceable characterization techniques at single-photon level.


Quantum Radiometry: Effort to create a linkage between the typical optical power measurement regime of conventional radiometry and the single-photon counting regime





Quantum Metrology for Quantum Communication

QUANTUM RADIOMETRY TARGETS

- Develop suitable metrics for:
 - Single Photon Sources
 - photon counting detectors
- Develop methods and measurement facilities for characterising non-classical properties of light:
 - anti-bunching
 - indistinguishability
 - entanglement
 - quantumness
- Develop measurement techniques:
 - to identify QKD systems security vulnerability
 - to assess attacks countermeasures



facilities for



Examples: Single Photon Detectors (SPD)



A device that **probabilistically transforms** the impinging single-photon into a macroscopically detectable electrical signal.

The detector provides the number of detection events within certain time duration, from which the detection count rate can be determined.

D1 - Detector gate repetition rate f_{gate}

D2 - Dark count probability p_{dark}

D3 - After-pulse probability $p_{\text{after_first}}(\Delta T)$ or $p_{\text{after_all}}(\Delta T)$ or $p_{\text{after_total}}$

D4 - Photon detection probability (Detection efficiency) $\eta(\nu)$ or $\eta(\lambda)$

D5 - Linearity factor (for detection efficiency) F_L

D6 - Detection efficiency range due to polarization variation of input pulses $\Delta\eta$

D7 - Dead time t_{dead}

D8 - Recovery time t_{recovery}

D9 - Detector signal jitter $\eta(t, T)$, where T denotes photon arrival time

D10 - Photon detection probability (detection efficiency) profile $\eta(t)$

D11 - Spectral Responsivity $\eta(\nu)$ or $\eta(\lambda)$

Pilot study on the quantum efficiency measurements

López et al. EPJ Quantum Technology (2020) 7:14
<https://doi.org/10.1140/epjqt/40507-020-00089-1>
 EPJ .ORG
 RESEARCH
 EPJ Quantum Technology
 a SpringerOpen Journal
 Open Access

A study to develop a robust method for measuring the detection efficiency of free-running InGaAs/InP single-photon detectors

M. López^{1*}, A. Meda², G. Porrovecchio³, R.A. Starkwood (Kirkwood)⁴, M. Genovese², G. Brida², M. Šmid³, C.J. Chunnillal⁴, I.P. Degiovanni² and S. Kück¹

DUT

Fiber-coupled ID
 Quantique type ID-220





Configuration:
 $\eta = 10\%$ and $D = 10 \mu\text{s}$


Photon Source: ID Quantique, id300



Traceability chain:

InGaAs-SPAD





$$\eta_{DUT} = \frac{P_c}{\alpha \cdot P_0}$$

- P_c : average optical power of the effective photons measured by the DUT
- P_c is calculated from the photon rate absorbed by the DUT **corrected for dead time and dark counts** (ρ_{corr}), at $\lambda = 1550.05$ nm

$$P_c = \frac{\rho_{corr} h c}{\lambda}$$

$$\rho_{corr} = f_{laser} \mu \eta_{DUT}$$

with f_{laser} = repetition rate of the laser ,
 μ mean number of photons per pulse

- In the absence of dark counts and dead times, the probability of having a “click” per laser pulse is $q = 1 - e^{-\mu \eta_{DUT}}$

The number of the corrected count rate is therefore: $\rho_{corr} = -f_{laser} \ln(1 - q)$

$$\alpha P_0 = \frac{h \cdot c}{\lambda} f_{laser} \mu = -\frac{h \cdot c}{\lambda} f_{laser} \frac{1}{\eta_{DUT}} \ln(1 - q)$$


The probability of having a click q must be inferred considering how dark counts and dead time D affect the counting process in a free running single-photon detector (**Model**)

Model for pilot study :

$$q = \frac{\rho_{click}}{f_{laser} - \rho_{click}} + \frac{f_{laser} \cdot (\rho_{click} - \rho_{click}^2 D + f_{laser} \cdot (\rho_{click} D + \rho_{click}^2 \cdot D^2 - 1))}{D \cdot (f_{laser} - \rho_{click})^2 (f_{laser} - \rho_{click} + \rho_{click} \cdot f_{laser} D)} \cdot \rho_{dark} \cdot D$$

Regime:

- Free running
- Pulsed laser with fixed f_{laser}
- up to 2.4 photons per pulse



Applied Physics Letters

ARTICLE scitation.org/journal/apl

Detection of ultra-weak laser pulses by free-running single-photon detectors: Modeling dead time and dark counts effects

Cite as: Appl. Phys. Lett. 118, 174002 (2021); doi: 10.1063/5.0046014
 Submitted: 31 January 2021 - Accepted: 6 April 2021 - Published Online: 26 April 2021



Hristina Georgieva,¹ Alice Meda,² Sebastian M. F. Raupach,¹ Helmuth Hofer,¹ Marco Gramegna,² Ivo Pietro Degiovanni,^{2,3} Marco Genovese,^{2,3} and Marco López,¹ and Stefan Kück¹

AFFILIATIONS
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PHYSICAL REVIEW A 105, 042615 (2022)

Detection rate dependence of the inherent detection efficiency in single-photon detectors based on avalanche diodes


Sebastian M. F. Raupach,^{1,*} Ivo Pietro Degiovanni,^{2,3} Hristina Georgieva,¹ Alice Meda,² Helmuth Hofer,¹ Marco Gramegna,² Marco Genovese,^{2,3} Stefan Kück¹, and Marco López¹
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³Istituto Nazionale di Fisica Nucleare, Sezione Torino, Via Giuria 1, 10125 Torino, Italy





Extended regime to 23 photons per pulse



Backflash emission



Quantifying backflash radiation to prevent zero-error attacks in QKD



INRIM SINGLE PHOTON OTDR

- The source is an attenuated pulsed laser
- Temporal trace: histogram of counts/time
- Temporal resolution: 130 ps (jitter of the detector), spatial resolution: 13 mm
- Back-Reflected light is detected by a free running InGaAs/InP detector; **significant light leakage** (8%) and **identifiable temporal profile**

A. Meda, et al. Light: Science & Applications 6, E16261 (2017)

Quantum Metrology for Quantum Communication



Project Coordinator: INRIM

Quantum Candela: radiometric measurements in the natural units, the number of photons

EMRP
European Metrology Research Programme
Programme of EURAMET
The EMRP is jointly funded by the EMRP participating countries within EURAMET and the European Union



SIQUTE

Project Coordinator: PTB

Deterministic and efficient single-photon sources for quantum metrology

EMRP
European Metrology Research Programme
Programme of EURAMET
The EMRP is jointly funded by the EMRP participating countries within EURAMET and the European Union




Project Coordinator: INRIM

Metrology for Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) in fiber



EMPIR  
The EMPIR initiative is co-funded by the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme and the EMPIR Participating States



Project Coordinator: INRIM

Metrology for free-space QKD and Anti-“Quantum-Hacking”

Project Coordinator: PTB

EMPIR  
The EMPIR initiative is co-funded by the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme and the EMPIR Participating States

SIQUST

Efficient single-photon sources for quantum technologies and quantum metrology

SEQUME

Project Coordinator: PTB

Single- and entangled photon sources for quantum metrology

19NRM06 MeTISQ

Project Coordinator: INRIM

Metrology for Testing the Implementation Security of Quantum Key Distribution Hardware

Project Consortium

NMI & DI



Industries



Academia



Chief Stakeholder




<http://empir.npl.co.uk/metisq/>

Stakeholder Advisory Board



MeTISQ aims to develop and standardise robust, SI-traceable measurements, at the single-photon level, to characterise:



- complete QKD modules: Transmitter and Receiver **T & R**
- new kinds of single-photon detector: active components of a QKD module *
- vulnerabilities to hacking attacks/effectiveness of counter-measures to such attacks: implementation security

Start date: 01 September 2020
Duration: 36 + 6 months

Standardised methods will support the commercialisation of novel QKD devices



Point-to-point (P2P) DV QKD are the most documented protocols by standardization bodies.

Twin field:

- weaker dependence on channel losses
- no need of trusted nodes or repeaters




Italian TF-QKD-ready field trial Quantum Backbone for QKD



[ETSI-WP8] ETSI White Paper No. 8 Quantum Safe Cryptography and Security An introduction, benefits, enablers and challenges



Dr. Salvatore Virzi poster





EMN for Quantum Technologies: EMN-Q

From: Strategic Agenda (V1.0, 22 Oct. 2020)



Rationale

- To align with industrial requirements, those of the **EC Quantum Technologies Flagship** and national and inter-governmental QT programmes, as well as those of any relevant stakeholder
- To contribute to QT developments through NMI's and DI's research and innovation activities
- To give input into the standardisation & certification of QT
- To promote of the benefits of metrology to the stakeholder community.

Vision

EMN-Q aims at being the recognised European unique reference point representing European metrology for Quantum Technologies.

www.euramet.org/quantum-technologies

quantum@euramet.org

Today, EMN-Q has **18 EURAMET Members and Partners** from 15 countries.

EMN-Q Structure and Organisation



Chair



Ivo P. Degiovanni (INRIM)



Marco Gramegna (INRIM)

Manager

Vice Chairs



Sébastien Bize (LNE-SYRTE)



Hansjörg Scherer (PTB)



Chris. Chunnillall (NPL)

Vice Coordinators



Christian Lisdat (PTB)



Félicien Schopfer (LNE)



Antti Manninen (VTT)



Mikael Lassen (DFM)



Marek Smid (CMI)

| | | | |
|-----------|----|--------------|----|
| Aalto | FI | LNE | FR |
| Metrosert | EE | LNE-LCM/CNAM | FR |
| CEM | SP | LNE-SYRTE | FR |
| CMI | CZ | METAS | CH |
| DFM | DK | VTT-MIKES | FI |
| GUM | PL | NPL | UK |
| INRIM | IT | PTB | DE |
| IPQ | PT | RISE | SE |
| JV | NO | UME | TR |

INRIM – Quantum Optics Labs

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INRiM - Quantum Metrology and Nanotechnologies Division

<https://quantum-optics.inrim.it/research>



EMN-Q

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Thanks for your attention!