



ETSI/IQC Quantum Safe Cryptography Event

Assessment of device-dependent quantum random number generators


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15/02/2023



Applications of Randomness



- For information security, it is crucial that the random numbers are:

Unbiased

Outputs are all equally likely

Unpredictable

Outputs are unique and knowledge of a subsequence cannot improve the ability to predict earlier or subsequent sequences

Types of RNGs

BSI categorisation of RNGs
2 Sep 2022 – Version 2.35 – DRAFT]

A Proposal for Functionality Classes for Random
Number Generators

Version 2.35 - DRAFT

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September 2, 2022

DRNG

Deterministic random-number generator (uses a deterministic algorithm)

PTRNG

Physical random-number generator (uses a physical source of entropy [noise])


NPTRNG

Non-physical random-number generator (uses a non-physical source of entropy [noise])

and hybrids

Types of RNGs

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5.4 (Para 937):

Quantum noise source. Quantum RNGs exploits physical phenomena that contain randomness according to the laws of quantum mechanics. This document does not distinguish between quantum entropy and entropy from physical phenomena based on other physical models. The AIS 31 considers quantum RNGs as PTRNGs already because of the digitization mechanism that transfers the analog data to raw random numbers.

Quantum random number generators

Output generated from a fundamentally random quantum process

Examples:

- Single photons incident on a beamsplitter
- Spontaneous emission of light



Security and unpredictability derived from laws of physics

- QRNGs permit thorough and accurate physical modelling and testing
- Increased knowledge of process \rightarrow increased predictability
- Classical noise can be removed through modelling

Types of QRNGs


Device independent → Bell inequality violation

Device dependent → no universal tests →

quantum entropy source
device properties
entropy quantification
randomness extraction

Statistical tests cannot confirm “quantumness” of the source, nor randomness of the numerical output

Assessment process



Homemade QRNG

Device



PHYSICAL REVIEW X 4, 031056 (2014)

Quantum Random Number Generation on a Mobile Phone

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
(Received 2 May 2014; revised manuscript received 25 July 2014; published 29 September 2014)



Assembled from commercial off-the-shelf components

Model

- Spontaneous emission of single photons (e-h+ pair)
- Independent propagation in linear medium
- Detection at a single pixel
- Probability p_i of i^{th} e-h+ pair at LED creating a free electron at the detector pixel



Number of charges released in pixel (n_e) is sum of N independent Bernoulli random trials

n_e follows a Poisson binomial distribution \sim Poisson distribution

$$P(n_e) = \sum_{\substack{X \in \{0,1\}^N \\ |X|_1 = n_e}} \prod_i^N (1 - p_i)^{(1-X_i)} p_i^{X_i}$$

$$X = \begin{bmatrix} 0 \\ 1 \\ 1 \end{bmatrix} \rightarrow p(n_e) = (1 - p_1)(p_2)(p_3)$$


Error δP in this approximation (Le Cam's theorem):

$$\bar{n}_e = \sum_{i=1}^N p_i \quad \delta P < 2 \sum_{i=1}^N p_i^2$$

Do not need to specify LED emission distribution

Cannot measure N , but can measure rate of photon emission N_{ph} – proxy (underestimate)

$$N_{ph} \sim 7.1 \times 10^{15} \text{ s}^{-1}$$



Incident photon rate on pixel

Pixel $\leq 5.85 \mu\text{m} \times 5.85 \mu\text{m}$

$$n_{ph} \leq 7 \times 10^5 \text{ s}^{-1}$$

$$\bar{q}_i = \frac{\overline{n_{ph}}}{N} < 10^{-10}$$

$$\delta P < 3 \times 10^{-4}$$

Average photon detection efficiency over all arriving photons: $\eta < 1$

$$p_i = \eta q_i$$

Since $\eta < 1$, n_e will be even better modelled by a Poisson distribution than n_{ph}

Dark counts


Assume a random variable, independent of n_e , accessible to an adversary

Cross-talk



Ignore cross-talk of dark counts

Consider only nearest-neighbour effects

Cross-talk $< 4 \times 10^{-3}$
Negligible




Amplification and ADC conversion




$$n_{out} = B[g(n_e' + n_d) + C_1]$$

After cross-talk \nearrow n_e' \nwarrow Classical noise (uncorrelated with n_e)



Extractable randomness


Number of bits that can be extracted from raw output of a pixel:








Extracted random sequence using Toeplitz hash algorithm

Next steps

- Apply methodology to prototype and commercial QRNG devices
- Seed an assessment process – aligned with existing standards



<http://www.aqurand.org>




Part of the Quantum
Flagship

Summary

- Assessment process for QRNGs, combining theoretical modelling with physical characterisation.
- Demonstrated process with 'homemade' device
- Extracted random sequence using Toeplitz hash algorithm
- (Passed NIST, TESTU01 statistical tests)
- Approach is compatible with existing standards
- Enables rigorous testing
- AQuRand project – 6 vendors pursuing this approach

Acknowledgements



Ke Guo
[York, NPL]



Tom Hebdige
[York]



Roger Colbeck
[York]



Christopher Chunnillall
[NPL]



Department for
Business, Energy
& Industrial Strategy



FUNDED BY BEIS

The National Physical Laboratory is operated by NPL Management Ltd, a wholly-owned company of the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS).

Questions?