







Core Objective

Protect users, networks and infrastructure from vulnerable connected products (IoT)



IoT Product Security - our work to date









The problem

NEWS

Reckless campaign of cyber attacks by Russian military intelligence service exposed

97% of risk pros say IoT cyberattack would be 'catastrophic' for their business • Any element Any element can be used as an attack vector. The proliferation of connected devices and Internet of Things (IoT) technology, which provide a plethora of entry points

for cybercriminals;

Enterprise's and their networks offer attackers:

- A broader attack surface
- Potentially higher value data
- Chance of greater scale of impact

Digital devices are far outpacing human beings in terms of sheer numbers









The scope









This includes:

- Enterprise printers
- Video conferencing systems
- VoIP phones
- Network Attached Storage (NAS) devices
- Room booking displays
- Laptops
- Smartphones
- Connected devices used in an
 - enterprise environment on a corporate network

• IP Camera





Our work to date

<image/> <text></text>	<text></text>	National Cyber Security Centre Enterprise
	Ipsos MORI	

Business Survey (2021)

Literature Review (2021)

NCSC-A Report (2021)







Mapping of enterprise IoT security publications to NCSC's Device **Security Principles (TBC 2023)**

devices (TBC 2023)



- Enterprise connected devices are being deployed and relied on by many organisations, however there are significant concerns from IT professionals about device security.
- Organisations lack clarity on how to monitor and protect themselves from devices
- Our mapping identified a number of areas where best practice could be more widely accepted by manufacturers to help protect users.
- Vulnerabilities are regularly found in enterprise connected devices which have put large numbers of organisations at risk.
- For example, our grant into the product testing of some common enterprise IoT devices found that:
 - Price does not guarantee better security
 - Lack of secure boot or integrity protection
 - Physical access compromise

- Outdated software is being widely used
- Lack of privilege separation
- General insecure configuration





Introducing NCSC's Device Security Principles for manufacturers - a basis for a new international standard?

- **1. Provide updates, securely** 2. Support appropriate authentication 3. Protect data at rest and in transit 4. Maintain device integrity 5. Ensure transparency of device health 6. Permit only trusted software 7. Minimise the privilege and reach of

- applications
- 8. Constrain the use of all device interfaces
- 9. Allow robust device management **10.Provide security logging, alerting,**
- and monitoring
- **11.Enable recovery to a known good** state

- Principles are not ordered by importance, but adjacent ones are often related
- Each principle contains a set of guidelines
- Principles describe the overall objective
- A framework that helps us work with industry to drive forward security standards in Enterprise **Connected Devices**





The foundation of the principles

ETSI EN 303 645 V2.1.1 (2020-06)



NISTIR 8259A 💋

IoT Device Cybersecurity Capability Core Baseline

NIST Special Publication 800-213A

IoT Device Cybersecurity Guidance for the Federal Government:



IoT Device Cybersecurity Requirement Catalog

Principles & Guidelines that keep at its core:

- Recognition of the move away from the traditional network security perimeter
- Detecting compromise through device health
- The wide range of Enterprise Connected Devices



Eight principles to help you to implement your own zero trust network architecture in an enterprise environment.

MITRE | ATT&CK*

aditional network security perimeter alth Devices



- Guideline 1.1: The manufacturer shall publish the minimum period for which the device will receive security updates.
- Guideline 1.2: The device shall verify that an update is from a trusted source and that it wasn't altered during transit.
- Guideline 1.3: The device should use best-practice cryptography to support secure updates.
- Guideline 1.4: The manufacturer shall publish a policy defining the regularity and frequency of updates.
- Guideline 1.5: Device updates shall be provided in response to critical vulnerabilities and incidents.
- Guideline 1.6: Updates shall be manageable and flexible for administrators or other authorised entities (either users or other devices or services) across device fleets.
- Guideline 1.7: Details of updates shall be published that state which publicly known vulnerabilities have been mitigated.







The structure

Guidelines explain how we expect a principle to be met:

Guideline 10.1: The organisation shall be able to view security events, either locally or remotely, related to a device

Guidelines explain if they apply to only some device types in scope: This guideline applies to all devices in scope. This guideline applies to devices that use pre-installed credentials that are unique per device.

Guidelines describe the threats and risks that require mitigation:

The ability to view a device's events is critical to help prevent and remediate attacks. Events may include information of who has logged into or attempted to log into the device, as well as when, where and the details of what actions have taken place. The level of detail revealed should be proportionate to the role of the viewer: i.e. administrators with full visibility of all aspects of a resource that they manage, whereas device users may have a limited visibility of events.





The structure (con**f**d)

Guidelines include examples and references to provide clarity:

Guideline 4.6: Devices can be physically hardened

Example: An unattended device outside of an organisation's office environment may require significant physical hardening such as tamper-evident seals. In contrast, portable devices such as laptops require simpler protection such as security screws to discourage opportunistic attacks.

Guidelines use modal verbs in line with IETF RFC2119 and the ETSI Drafting Rules:

Guideline 10.3: The device shall support the capability to securely forward and export logs

Guideline 11.2: The device should be capable of being remotely wiped

Guideline 9.4: Devices can use open standards and mechanisms for communicating with device management platforms 🖉

Guideline 5.3: During runtime, the health of the device should be available remotely

References for this guideline include:

- NCSC's Zero Trust architecture principles 2, 3 & 6
- ETSI EN 303 645: Ensure software integrity
- MITRE: T1070 Indicator Removal on Host
- MITRE: T1543 Create or Modify System Process
- MITRE: T1542 Pre-OS Boot
- NIST SP 800-213A: Cybersecurity State Awareness
- Audit Support & Protection
- State Awareness Support
- NIST SP 800-213A: Device Security Device Integrity



Where does it fit?

Enterprise Security Principles would still aid detection and response or minimise harm

Note: this is an approximation

Recent ("N-day") Vulnerabilities (< 6 months)

Zero Day Vulnerabilities

Increasing complexity of cyber threat

- Guideline 4.1: The firmware and operating system on the device shall only be modifiable using authorised update mechanisms.
- Guideline 4.2: The device shall support pre-operating system boot security.
- Guideline 4.3: The device should have a built-in framework for runtime integrity protection.
- Guideline 4.4 The device shall provide documented exploit mitigation capabilities that shall be used by all system and pre-installed software.
- Guideline 4.5: Integrity of device health data should be maintained on the device.
- Guideline 4.6: The device can be physically hardened.







Our vision and next steps

- Consultation on our work, the current principles and future interventions
- One option: principles to be refined (for example, SBOMs?) and introduced as a new work item, e.g. in TC Cyber?
- Explore other levers to help organisations with their procurement, deployment and management of enterprise connected devices on their corporate networks







James.Deacon@dcms.gov.uk Rhys.Duncan@dcms.gov.uk Matt.H5@ncsc.gov.uk



