



Security Conference

Automated and Continuous Cybersecurity Certification for IoT


Presented by:
Prof. Shahid Raza
Director of Cybersecurity Unit @RISE

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18/10/2023




Cybersecurity Unit @ RISE





RISE Cybersecurity Unit

One of the largest cybersecurity research and innovation groups in Sweden



Participate in

- European Cybersecurity Organization (ECISO)
- EU Stakeholder Cybersecurity Certification Group (SCCG)
- Standardization (IETF, 5GAA, ...)

Leading the Swedish National Cybersecurity Innovation Node (part of **NCC-SE**)

Owens RISE Cyber Range

Co-founder of **Cybercampus Sweden** (cybercampus.se)


Coordinator of **Horizon Europe CUSTODES**, a cyber certification project



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What is an IoT




IoT security building blocks



Who ensures that the state-of-the-art cybersecurity is enabled?

- Software security

- Code analysis
- Fuzzing and testing of code
- Formal methods



- Hardware-based Root of Trust (RoT)

- Endorsement Key (EK) – unique
- Platform Configuration Registers (PCR) store hashes of software present/loaded on the device.

Cybersecurity Certification for IoT software

More than 99% vulnerabilities are software based


High-level step in IoT cyber certification

1. A device vendor communicates the secure state of a device to a conformity assessment body (CAB)
2. The CAB verifies the software integrity of the device and issue an integrity certificate
3. A potential communication end-point (Edge/cloud) of IoT devices verifies that the device integrity certificate is valid and/or the current state and the attested state are the same

IoT software certification: design requirements

- Digital guarantees: based on math and crypto (not verbal or manual guarantees)
- The process must be automated and lightweight
- Certification should work with future software updates
- Validity & authenticity of the certificate should be easily verifiable
- Certification process should itself be secure

IoT Device Remote Attestation





Using PKI for both Authentication & Assurance

- Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is a state-of-the-art digital certificate management system for the Internet
- Can we leverage on PKI infrastructure and use X.509 certificates also as integrity certificate?
 - Include **assurance attributes** in X.509 extensions
 - Can be marked as non-critical ensuring compatibility with standard X509 certificates when integrity certificate is not needed

- IETF RFC 9148: Enrollment over Secure Transport with the Secure Constrained Application Protocol
- CBOR Encoded X.509 Certificates (C509 Certificates). draft-ietf-cose-cbor-encoded-cert-05
- PKI4IoT: Towards Public Key Infrastructure for the Internet of Things. Computers & Security journal (Elsevier), Volume 89,Pages 101658, February 2020
- Lightweight Certificate Revocation for Low-power IoT with End-to-end Security. Journal of Information Security and Applications (Elsevier), Volume 73, 103424, March, 2023

Combined Authentication & Assurance Certificate




<i>Cert_{AC}</i> - X509 certificate with extensions 	
Data	Version : V3
	Serial number : e 4 b b 2 f 3 d 4 5 e f a 6 b c d...
	Signature : ecdsaWithSHA256
	Issuer : CA Name
	Validity : Friday, Feb 28, 2022 12:00:00 to Friday, Dec 31, 2022 12:00:00
	Subject (<i>UDev_{ID}</i>) : 'Device Name :: CA Name' or EUI-64
	Subject public key info : ecPublicKey, prime256v1 & 64-byte uncompressed ECC public key
Issuer & subject <i>uniqueID</i> : -	
Extensions	<i>Assurance Level</i> : OID : xx . xx . xx . xx Critical : No Value : High
	<i>integrity_proof</i> : OID : xx . xx . xx . xx Critical : No Value : PublicKey
	<i>Signature_{CAB}</i> : OID : xx . xx . xx . xx Critical : No Value : 21 a6 09 f4 11 06
Signature	Signature algorithm : ecdsaWithSHA256
	Signature : 30 82 01 0a 02 82 01 01



Addressing TOCTOU issue

- Time-of-check Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) is a race condition between the time the devices was attested and the current state.
- Using TPM, an **attester** (IoT device) generates *integrity key (IK)*, an asymmetric keypair IK_{priv} and IK_{pub} , using the *PCRSelection* (hashes of software).
- The *PCRSelection* ensures that **IK** will not be valid if the software state of the device changes (a.k.a., TPM Sealing)
- IK is strictly connected with the state of IoT device and detects TOCTOU discrepancy if software is updated

Realtime Verification of Assurance



AutoCert – The Process



Implementation & Evaluation

Proof-of-Concept implementation with

AutoCert: Automated TOCTOU-secure Digital Certification for IoT with combined Authentication and Assurance". In: *Computers & Security* journal (2023)




OPTIGA TPM Evaluation Kit (Infineon)

A result




Average latency of each TPM function on the OPTIGA TPM evaluation platform.

New Standardization Efforts at IETF




Conclusion

- An IoT device software state can be automatically attested, verified, and certified
 - Provides TOCTOU security between remote attestation and certification
 - Combines IoT assurance with PKI digital certificate (Authentication-Assurance Certificate)
 - Remote attestation mechanism based on standards (RATS)
 - Standardized way for distribution of certificate (PKI)



Match b/w remote attestation & certificate Issuance, TOCTOU-secure



Avoid storing additional certificate



Standard compliance

Thanks

<https://shahidaza.net>

